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Fleshly beauty: an anthropological perspective 
 
Alexander Edmonds 
University of Edinburgh 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an anthropological perspective on the beauty of the 
human body.  I engage with studies of beauty in the social sciences and 
humanities, including my own ethnographic fieldwork in Brazil.  This work might 
broadly be called “social constructionist” in that it has demonstrated enormous 
variation in beauty norms.  It often entails critique since such norms can inscribe 
social inequalities.  I also take up this volume’s invitation, however, to “go 
beyond” the relativist approach that has dominated much discussion of 
aesthetics.  My aim is to explore the generative capacity of beauty to alter social 
life in ways that are not entirely predicted by cultural symbolism or other 
inequalities.  I ask: what affects and wider social effects are set in motion by 
beauty?  
As a heuristic (a “device for discovery”), I suggest the term fleshly beauty.  
The connotations of fleshly – as opposed to the more abstract bodily -- direct 
attention to aspects of beauty I want to highlight here.  A morally charged word 
in the Judeo-Christian tradition, fleshly refers to the substance of the body, but 
also to appetites and desires.  It invokes an opposition to the spiritual or rational, 
and implies the body has agency “of its own.”  More archaically, but also useful 
here, fleshly refers to bonds of blood and sex between people.  Fleshly beauty is 
thus in part an inherited property of the body, linking generations.  The flesh also 
draws sexual partners together, who cleave to each other and in the biblical 
phrase “shall be in one flesh” -- another property of beauty relevant here.  
The term fleshly beauty suggests the important relationships between 
beauty and strong affects, such as desire, fantasy, arousal, shaking knees, among 
others.  Philosopher Elaine Scarry (2001) points out that in the classical world, a 
glimpse of a beautiful person imperilled the observer, rather than the observed, 
suggesting the risks of beauty were quite different to contemporary ones.  In the 
Phaedrus Plato describes a man who after beholding a beautiful youth begins to 
spin, shudder, shiver, and sweat.  Of course, the perception of a beautiful person 
does not always create such affects.  Due to the amazing plasticity of human 
sexuality, the responses beauty provokes may be sublimated, transferred to an 
object, expressed through art, etc.  But one salient aspect of the beauty of the 
person is that it has a special power to provoke erotic affects, though not all 
beauty does, and not all such affects involve beauty. 
I argue it is important to consider these relationships between beauty and 
erotic affect, though philosophy and social science have often neglected them.  
Anthropological philosophy in the eighteenth century proposed that beauty must 
not prompt egoistic behaviour or be too closely linked to practical activity.  I use 
the term fleshly beauty to signal a break from this philosophical argument and a 
focus on “interested” responses to beauty.  Twentieth century social sciences 
also largely passed over the erotic dimensions of beauty.  These fields broke with 
the Kantian project of investigating aesthetics as a universal human faculty of 
judgment, and instead embedded aesthetics within variable cultural contexts.  
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However, the focus of social sciences on symbolism and inequalities also led to 
neglect of beauty’s capacity to create affects -- such as attraction or emulation – 
which can contravene utilitarian logics or social classifications.   
In this chapter I investigate beauty as a domain of the human that gives 
rise to powerful affects and important social effects.  This generative capacity of 
beauty is rooted in the flesh and cannot be entirely explained by other systems of 
status and social differentiation, such as pedigree, age, ethnicity, or wealth.  My 
aim is to develop a practice perspective that sheds light not just on aesthetic 
norms, but on what beauty means and does in everyday social life.   
 
Beauty in anthropological philosophy and social anthropology  
 
Kant did not devote much space to the beauty of people, as opposed to 
nature or art, but what he did write illustrates the problem that such beauty 
poses for the philosophy of aesthetics.  Like Freud would later, he unsurprisingly 
writes from the perspective of the male gaze on feminine beauty, but he also 
foreshadows Freud’s (1953) understanding of beauty as sublimated sexual 
impulses: “This complete fascination [with the “form and features of the fair 
sex”] is really overlaid upon the sex instinct.” (Kant 2003: 86)  Kant does not 
elaborate on this point and seems only to concede it so that he can introduce 
distance between sexuality, which entails interested, egoistic behaviour, and real 
beauty, which cannot.   
To this end he makes a distinction between “very pretty persons 
completely without moral feeling” (88), who appeal only to “course natures,” and 
those who are truly “beautiful.”  The latter category of women have a “moral 
expression” in their appearance, which can only be recognised by a “fine taste.” 
Kant also introduces another aesthetic hierarchy, not of taste, but of race, when 
he discusses the desire of Turks, Arabs and Persians to “beautify their races” 
through the “fine blood of Circassian and Georgian maidens” (91).  His comments 
reproduce conventional wisdom about women, class and “blood,” but they also 
reflect larger philosophical goals in his investigation of aesthetics.   
For Kant the pleasure derived from beauty does not produce a desire to 
do anything in particular but rather is merely contemplative.  His distinction 
between true beauty animated by moral feeling, and mere prettiness, which 
provokes a “course” sexual response, preserves a notion of aesthetic judgment as 
“disinterested contemplation.”  Kant’s emphasis on the importance of disinterest 
in aesthetic perception was, of course, enormously influential in philosophy, but 
was also taken up by later racial anthropology.  The German fin-de-siècle 
anthropologist Carl Heinrich Stratz argued that only Nordic women could be 
truly beautiful, because they alone did not arouse mundane sexual interest (Hau 
2003: 83).  Both Kant, and the later, explicitly racial anthropology, could be said 
to remove beauty from the ordinary realm of sexual interest in order to explore a 
“purified” and universal faculty of aesthetic judgment.  
 In twentieth century social anthropology discussion of beauty focused 
more on cultural artefacts and performance than on the beauty of the human 
body. Ethnographies of body modification, though, make many passing 
references to beauty practices.  These works could be said to be social 
constructionist in that they show how body modification expresses cultural 
symbolism.  For example, among the Sudanese Nuba, scarification signals a 
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woman’s passage through puberty and motherhood.  This analytic focus 
contributed to the ethical project of Boasian cultural relativism.  In the accounts 
of travellers the body modification of non-Europeans was a potent mark of 
savagery.  Thus, showing how even the most disfiguring practices (such as neck 
elongation, foot binding etc.) have a “meaning” makes them seem rational, or 
familiarly human, not savage.  
In fact earlier philosophical discussion of aesthetics had also rationalized 
savage beauty.  Hegel (2008: 171) found the body alterations of non-Europeans 
to be “barbarous, tasteless, and entirely disfiguring,” yet he also conceded there 
was a “rational ground” to such practices.  They stemmed from a “human need” 
to alter “natural form,” thus opening the door to a humanising perspective on the 
beauty practices of others.  Levi-Strauss also rationalized body modification in 
that he related it to a near universal “horror of nature” (1973[1956]).  Caduveo 
Indian facial paintings “confer human dignity upon the individual; they  ensure 
the transition from nature to culture, from ‘stupid beast’ to civilised man” 
(1973[1955]).  Levi-Strauss’ interest in body modification was, however, 
subservient to his aim of investigating abstract sets of relationships present 
across ritual and mythological systems (1983).   
The main thrust, however, of ethnographic accounts of body modification 
was to focus on the ritual context that made a particular practice meaningful.  
These analyses often entailed a relativizing critique that delinked body 
modification from racial and aesthetic hierarchies. This was an important 
critique to make given the fact that physical anthropology and eugenics 
buttressed its racial science with appeals to aesthetic taste.  For example, 
German anthropologist Blumenbach chose the term Caucasian in 1795 to denote 
the highest evolutionary stage of man precisely because of conventional wisdom, 
also expressed by his contemporary Kant, that peoples from the Caucasus region 
were exceptionally beautiful (Gould 1981).1 The intellectual blind spot, however, 
of social anthropology’s treatment was that it tended to downplay the aesthetic, 
and even more so, erotic properties of the flesh.   
An exception, one of the only full-length anthropological monographs on a 
beauty norm, is Rebecca Popenoe’s (2004) excellent work on the Azawagh Arabs 
in Niger.  This group practices “fattening” --feeding milk and porridge to 
adolescent girls until they become not so much plump as “obese” in Western 
terms, though Popenoe’s point is that this medical and stigmatising label is far 
from Azawagh understandings of fat.  The book could also be said to be a 
constructionist account of beauty ideals in that it analyses how they “partake of 
cultural values that operate in several domains” (189), such as marriage 
endogamy and symbolism about health.   
Popenoe’s (2004) work in my reading seems ambiguous when discussing 
the relationships between beauty and sexuality.  The topic does not receive much 
attention until her last chapter, in which she concludes that “ultimately” fatness 
is a “sexualised aesthetic” or in her informants’ words: “a fat woman is hot.  A 
thin woman is like a man” (190).  The term “sexualised” implies the flesh is 
passive, made sexual by society.  Yet, whatever traditions fatness expresses and 
which make it self-evidently beautiful and good, fleshly beauty also arouses 
erotic affects that ultimately can threaten the Azawagh cultural emphasis on 
controlling sexuality (Ch. 9).  Sexual intercourse with unmarried women is 
prohibited, Popenoe notes, yet a man might steal into the fattening huts to 
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“please himself between a woman’s thighs” (191).  Not all women “achieve” or 
maintain the fat ideal, and there is much instability in sexual relationships.  
Divorce and remarriage are frequent and extra-marital sex is the norm.  Since 
women’s social status and wealth is highly dependent on having a husband and 
sons, they are under considerable pressure to maintain the bodily “heat” and 
sexual attractiveness that will “bind men to them, sexually and thereby socially” 
(183).  
This point suggests that individual differences in attractiveness and the 
fleshly capacity to fatten can have major social consequences, provoking 
jealousy, competition, or inappropriate unions.  While it’s clear that society plays 
a large role in shaping the Azawagh beauty norm, Popenoe’s work raises 
questions about what effects attractiveness (or ugliness) in a person have on the 
people around them.  Can the beauty of the body always be read as referring to 
something else, or does it generate its own effects and affects that contradict 
cultural logics – a question I return to below.    
Critique is implicit in Popenoe’s work since the Azawagh aesthetic norm 
is so radically different from the Western “tyranny of slenderness” (Chernin 
1981).  It is more explicit, of course, in feminist accounts of Western beauty 
norms and practices as a “major articulation of capitalist patriarchy” (Bartky 
1990, Morgan 1991).  Beauty practices create body alienation and forms of self-
surveillance that unequally affect women (Bordo 1993) and support the financial 
interests of male-dominated beauty and fashion industries as well as male 
control of the workplace (Wolf 1991).  Other critiques examine how beauty 
practices and norms reinforce racial or colour hierarchies (e.g. Kaw 1993, Monk 
2014).  Such critique -- and in the next section I discuss my own ethnographic 
work on in Brazil as an example of it -- could also be said to be constructionist in 
that it shows that beauty norms express variable power dynamics.   
One problem with both the anthropological and feminist critique is that  
the body seems to be passive in these accounts, pliable clay moulded in the 
image of society.  Beauty reveals something about patriarchy and racism, but so 
too do many aspects of social life, raising the question of whether there are any 
specific qualities to beauty?  Does the flesh also impose some limits on the 
capacity of society (or history, discourse, etc.) to inscribe it?  Do aesthetic 
judgments of, and responses to, particular individuals alter social life in ways not 
entirely determined by other hierarchies and cultural symbolism?  
 
Constructions of beauty and race in Brazil 
 
To discuss these questions I introduce a more detailed example from my 
ethnographic fieldwork on beauty and plastic surgery in Brazil (Edmonds 2007, 
2010, 2013).  Brazil has experienced rapid growth in cosmetic surgery since the 
1990s and in 2013 surpassed the U.S. as the country with the most cosmetic 
procedures performed in the world.  Media and a celebrity-centred pop culture 
have aggressively promoted and marketed plastic surgery, or simply plástica as 
it is known.  The provision of free or subsidised cosmetic procedures in some 
public hospitals, as well as credit plans, have also made the practice more 
accessible to the working class and emergentes, those struggling to “emerge” into 
the middle classes.  I’ve argued that surgery has also been normalised and 
integrated in mainstream women’s reproductive health care for the middle 
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classes, fuelling aspirational desires to obtain a modern medical good (2010, 
2013).  Thus, patients from across Brazil’s class and colour spectrums have 
limited access to cosmetic surgery, making the practice a good site for studying 
tensions and aspirations around beauty.   
Brazil’s aesthetic norms and practices are entangled with its construction 
of race.  In the early twentieth century scholars, artists, and eventually the state 
rejected racial anthropology and whitening ideologies and began to embrace 
racial mixture as a defining feature of the nation (Schwarcz 1999, Fry 2000). 
Mixture, mestiçagem, became an emblem of “racial democracy.” It was also 
aestheticized and eroticised, in highly gendered ways, for example in the work of 
Gilberto Freyre (1986) who rejected “Aryan” beauty norms and practices 
(Vianna 1999).  Modernists embraced a vision of “the people,” particularly 
women, as exhibiting kaleidoscopic beauty, endless variation in skin hue and 
phenotypic permutations deriving from centuries of mixing amongst Europeans, 
Africans and “Indians.”   
The affirmation of mixture is also present in much contemporary beauty 
talk and beauty work.  Unlike in much of Asia, the ideal is not very pale skin 
(which is sometimes considered a liability in a tropical climate); rather, a large 
range of skin hues is seen as potentially beautiful.  Cosmetic surgeons also 
praised the effects of European-African mixing on the female body, referencing a 
more erotic national beauty ideal defined by round hips, thighs and buttocks, 
contrasted with narrow waists, and relatively small breasts (Hanchard 1994). In 
pursuit of this ideal surgeons redistribute fat from the waist to the hips, or 
perform breast reduction surgery, which in Brazil sometimes has not a 
functional rationale (reducing back pain) but a purely cosmetic one.   
However, beauty norms and practices also reveal the lingering presence 
of whitening ideologies and contradictions in the ideal of racial democracy.  
Elites, such as former president Cardoso, claim mixed ancestry with the 
expression um pé na cozinha,“one foot in the kitchen” – a reference to a black 
ancestor, a woman slave or servant.  This half-joke is perhaps intended to link 
the speaker to “the people” via reference to the primordial scene in the national 
imaginary of sex between a white master and darker servant.  But many women 
have their own stories of “one foot in the kitchen,” which reflect ambivalence 
about the legacy of mixture.  The sun is said to “ruin” pale skin while weight gain 
is problem thought to disproportionately affect darker Brazilians.  Some women 
said mischievously that they had inherited a good bunda (butt) from a darker 
relative.  Others referred to a nose “given” by a black ancestor that needed 
surgical “correction.” Surgeons and patients praised some forms of mixture, but 
said others were “ugly,” and saw surgery as a means of “harmonising” 
combinations of traits.  
The embrace of mixture also coexists with global thinner and whiter 
beauty norms for women, and more recently, a “fad” for breast implants that has 
brought complaints of “cultural imperialism.”  These global norms tend to be 
more dominant in highbrow fashion and elite media domains.  Some working 
class women, in contrast, criticize imported “fashions,” insisting that “thin thighs 
are feia (ugly).”  On the other hand, in mainstream media and everyday 
evaluations of appearance the dominant ideal is relatively European facial 
features and hair, or a whitish appearance, as you can say in Portuguese with 
terms such as brancinha.  Those considered “too black” encounter aesthetic 
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stigma and widespread racial discrimination (Telles 2004, Winddance Twine 
1998).   
To counter discrimination black activists have made the embrace of a new 
aesthetic of “black beauty” a central component of racial pride (Fry 2002, 
Edmonds 2010).  They have urged Brazilians to reject colour terms and instead 
adopt a bi-polar racial system classifying groups into “whites” and “blacks.”  This 
identity work is often accompanied by beauty work, for example, replacing hair 
straightening with “black styles.”  Yet while the black movement has been 
politically influential, older aesthetic norms and practices remain highly popular 
and self-evidently beautiful to many consumers.  While elites affirmed mixture as 
a trait of the people with aesthetic and cultural value, and a later grassroots 
movement promoted black aesthetics, the older ideal of whitening (Skidmore 
1974) persists in much beauty talk and beauty work.  Thus, beauty norms could 
be said to express a cultural logic of race with deep roots in colonial society as 
well as more recent aspirations and anxieties.  
  
The generative capacity of beauty 
 
So far this analysis has fallen broadly within the social constructionism of 
social anthropology and feminist critique.  I now turn to the generative aspects of 
fleshly beauty I have not yet addressed.  My aim is to analyze tensions between, 
on the one hand, beauty – as a fleshly property of the person– and on the other 
hand, the logics of social classification.   
Paul Ricoeur (1970) points out the importance of a “hermeneutics of 
suspicion” in social sciences and humanities to investigate the hidden structures 
underlying social life, be they economic, political or symbolic.  He points out, 
though, that this mode of analysis is sometimes complemented by a 
“hermeneutics of retrieval.”  This kind of interpretive work entails crossing 
barriers of culture, class, or history in order to see social life from an actor-
centred perspective.  As I began analysing my fieldwork material my focus was 
on the veiled social and historical processes that constructed beauty norms.  I 
was left, though, with a sense of dissatisfaction.  I had understood something, I 
thought, about how beauty practices and norms reflect contradictions in 
Brazilian health care and in its constructions of race and gender.  But was there 
something that Brazil might teach about beauty?   
 Moving into a “retrieval” mode I began to think more about the inherited 
aspects of attractiveness, which were often the object of everyday commentary. 
Conversations about appearance suggested a kind of aesthetic lottery of birth.  
The inheritance of beauty, in this view, is a highly random and unpredictable 
matter.  Some traits were particularly valued, such as straight hair.  Kin often 
praised beleza (beauty) in a family member, but might also worry about its 
consequences.  Some siblings were said to “come out” with markedly different 
“colours” or combinations of facial features and hair, which could lead to 
embarrassing “scenes,” for example, when a mother with a lighter daughter is 
mistaken for her nanny.  
 Brazil’s colour hierarchies reflect racial domination; however, they are 
not entirely congruent with aesthetic hierarchies.  Just as some poorer people 
are said to be more beautiful than richer ones, so too some darker people are 
said to be more beautiful than lighter people.  I realized, again in a “retrieval” 
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mode, that beauty has a hereditary logic of its own, one which is not reducible to 
other social hierarchies, and which mattered to my informants.   
While the inheritance of beauty is unfair in that it rewards people without 
regard to their merit, I argue that the relationship between beauty and social 
hierarchy is more complex than it might appear at first.  Scarry (2001) points out 
that a major contemporary critique of beauty is that it entails hierarchies of taste 
and judgment that conflict with egalitarian ideals.  Scarry, in fact, argues against 
this critique of beauty, maintaining instead that beauty is compatible with 
“justice.”  Scarry has, in my view, correctly identified the modern (or really quite 
recent) ethical ground of beauty, though I disagree with her defence of beauty, at 
least when it applies to persons.   
Beauty is indeed highly undemocratic.  Sociologists and economists have 
shown that “lookism” can have social and emotional consequences comparable 
to racism (though in multi-ethnic societies these two forms of discrimination 
often overlap) (Hammermesh 2011, Harper 2000, Anderson et al 2010).  The 
benefits of beauty should not be exaggerated and indeed women judged “too 
attractive” can also be punished for this attribute (Wolf 1991).  Still, attractive 
men and women on average enjoy a wide range of benefits -- in school, work, sex 
and romantic love, that is, in three major domains of the modern self.  These 
benefits are unfair in that they do not reward moral qualities of the person.  
However, the very unfairness of the inheritance of beauty also endows it with a 
capacity to confer benefits to those excluded from other systems of privilege.   
Returning to the perspective of my informants it seemed that nature 
exhibited to them a kind of black humour – or a “just injustice” – in sometimes 
passing over those most “deserving” and sometimes gracing those denied the 
privileges of birth or wealth.  The inheritance of beauty can be said to operate as 
a “double negative”: it allocates power unfairly, but can disturb other unfair 
hierarchies.  While beauty is unfair in that it appears to be “awarded” to the 
morally undeserving, it can also grant power to those excluded from other 
systems of privilege based in wealth, pedigree, or education. 
For many of the poorer Brazilians I knew part of the appeal of beauty – 
either inherited or enhanced -- was that it seemed to offer a means to, almost 
magically, bypass the myriad obstacles they otherwise face.  In Brazil many 
dreams of social mobility center on the body.  For boys the odds of becoming a 
professional footballer are remote indeed, yet this dream remains remarkably 
widespread in part because it represents a form of success that does not need 
money or wealth to attain.  It seems to lie within the means of those without 
means.  Perhaps the nearest feminine counterpart to these hyper-masculine 
icons are Brazil’s artistas (celebrities): actresses, models and dancers.  Talent 
may or may not be perceived to contribute to their success, but nearly all are 
known for the perfection of their bodily beleza (beauty), discussed in detail by 
the Brazilian media.  Their dreamlike, almost overnight attainment of great 
wealth and glamour seems to arouse the widespread dream of becoming such an 
artista.  Modelling talent searches get enormous turnout across the country, 
while some NGOs, such as “Lens of Dreams” in City of God favela , give teenagers 
lessons in modeling.  Fashion models hardly seem like good “role models” for 
disadvantaged youth in part because their success does not require hard work, 
but rare genetic endowment. Yet perhaps the very fact that bodily beauty seems 
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to be inherited “blindly” – or partly independently of other status markers -- may 
explain its democratic appeal.  
Modelling of course often simply remains a sonho, dream, and in urban 
peripheries many women concentrate their energies on finding an alternative to 
what was practically the default job for their mothers and grandmothers: 
domestic service (Goldenberg 2000).  The most accessible escape route from this 
social destiny is work in the expanding informal and service economies.  Beauty 
and youth are less explicit job requirements here, yet women job seekers said 
these traits are often informal hiring criteria in the fashionable boutiques, bars 
and hotels that surround many of Rio’s favelas.  These bodily qualities can 
become all the more salient for poorer women as they can help offset the 
disadvantages of relative darkness, low education, or a favela address.    
The significance of attractiveness for relationships is more complex, but 
here too beauty is sometimes seen as a resource that generates important social 
effects.  In some Rio favelas women joke about pulling a golpe de bau, a treasure 
chest coup, or seduction of a wealthier “crown” through a combination of 
cunning and physical attractiveness (Goldstein 2003).  In an environment where 
men are often expected to have multiple relationships, and women’s income is 
unpredictable, attracting and keeping a male partner is often seen as an essential 
means to accessing diverse resources.  Attractiveness often is given a more 
explicit value in sex work.  For example, travesti (transvestite) sex workers 
measure precisely how much an improvement to their bodies (achieved with 
female contraceptives and silicone injections) translates into money earned on 
the street (Kulick 1998).  Yet, beauty is also valued in a wider range of 
relationships beyond sex-for-money exchanges, and can be converted into 
resources that are not only material (Bernstein 2007).  Brazil has a vibrant youth 
culture -- often body centred and cutting across class distinctions -- that is well 
connected to a booming tourism sector.  In its cosmopolitan cities youth of all 
classes often have opportunities to mingle with the middle class, and sexual and 
romantic encounters, both gay and straight, bring not only material benefits but 
also new experiences, travel, and cultural resources (Parker 1999).  The 
relatively open sexual and youth cultures of Brazil also contribute to a highly 
competitive “market” of relationships in which body work is undertaken in order 
to “compete.”  Beauty is not seen as a luxury but as something essential, which 
“does put food on the table,” as one working class woman put it, reversing an old 
Brazilian proverb, Beauty does not put food on the table.   
The patients who sought cosmetic surgery in public or charity hospitals 
often expected to get immediate, material benefits from their operations: earning 
more income, forming relationships, “entering TV” (as an actress or model).  
Other patients wanted surgery to protect themselves from vulnerability in a 
competitive, uncertain world of work and relationships.  Such motives 
disconcerted surgeons (at least the more ethically minded ones) and 
psychologists who work at clinics to screen out problem patients, and who 
believe the only good reason for cosmetic surgery is to raise auto-estima, self-
esteem.  Some women “learned” this psychotherapeutic rationale through their 
interactions at the clinic, while others rejected it, seeing surgery as a means to 
“get somewhere in society.”  These patients did not see beauty as a condition of 
the body that prompts disinterested contemplation, but on the contrary various 
interested responses, not all of them desired.   
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My argument is not that beauty is empowerment, as others have indeed 
argued.  Catherine Hakim (2010), for example, provocatively claims that 
women’s “erotic capital” is so valuable because demand for it is high: men want 
sex more than women do, on average; since beauty contributes to erotic capital, 
it confers power (see Green 2013 for a critique).  Yet, many of the benefits 
promised by the inheritance or enhancement of beauty fail to materialise.  
Beauty is interlinked with youth and inherently transient.  In contrast, cultural 
capital, such as education, tends to accrue value over time.  The value of many 
aspects of beauty (such as relative lightness) is determined by power structures.  
Moreover, it is not always clear who owns whatever benefits do flow from bodily 
or sexual capital, Ashley Mears (2014, 2011) argues.  Many of the profits that 
derive from women’s beauty in fashion and entertainment industries are 
appropriated by men.  Beneath its glittering surface, there is indeed much about 
beauty that is “suspicious.”   
Thus, perhaps the actor centred perspective I have tried to “retrieve” here 
is simply a form of false consciousness.  Political organisation or self-
development might bring more lasting rewards than attractiveness.  However, I 
believe that my informants also had insight into the role of attractiveness in the 
forms of exchange mandated and incited in consumer capitalism.  Beauty is not 
only a “superficial” or “skin deep” attribute of the person .  It also generates 
effects in work markets and in the unpredictable field of love and sex – effects 
that may take on even more importance for those unable to gain other forms of 
social recognition.  The capacity of the attractive person to redirect the gaze of 
society at her or him can also seem to reveal the contradictions in the liberal 
ideology that work and education are viable means of social mobility for all.  
Some elite women I knew expressed bathos at what they called the “vanity of 
their maids” -- the care their servants took with their nails or even their 
attainment of plástica.  Such “vanity” though also testifies to the desire among 
working class women to negate the indignities of domestic service and, more 
generally, the invisibility of poverty. Beauty norms do not only inscribe 
inequality; rather the fleshly capacities of their bodies seem to provide limited 
escape from the injustices that are everywhere around them and of which they 
are well aware.     
 
Beyond aesthetic relativism?   
 
 In this chapter I intended to respond to the volume’s invitation to think 
“beyond a purely aesthetic and relativist stance.”  But has my analysis actually 
done so?  I argued that racialised and other status hierarchies are not congruent 
with aesthetic hierarchies.  This lack of congruency is important because the 
perception and response to fleshly beauty creates affects and effects not entirely 
predicted by other forms of social domination and symbolism.   
One objection to my argument, however, is that such affects and effects 
are themselves constructed, and therefore my analysis has not “gone beyond” 
the relativist stance.  In one sense, but only a trivial one I believe, this objection is 
true.  All phenomena are socially constructed in the sense that they can only be 
represented through symbolic means.  There is no beauty “in itself” apart from 
what is perceived by a social being.  But this notion of social constructionism is 
as reductive as the biologism that says all human action is caused by chemistry.  
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A constructionist logic can be applied recursively to itself to show that its 
account of the world-as-constructed is also constructed, and hence a partial 
view.  As Donna Haraway (1988) points out, seeing makes a world according to 
the capacities of a particular eye (human, fly, robot, etc.).  Like any form of 
seeing, constructionism leaves some things in -- and others out.   As 
anthropologists we may never entirely be free, as it were, of the worlds we 
construct in our scholarship; yet we can investigate our intellectual blind spots, 
glimpse them obliquely.  
In this chapter I asked: in what ways are the inheritance of beauty and 
responses to it not determined by social hierarchy and cultural meaning?  Social 
constructionism grants agency to the abstraction of Society (or History, 
Discourse, Biopower, etc.).  We might also ask how this agency becomes 
entangled with -- and sometimes limited by -- other agencies, even if they are 
unknowable “in themselves.”  One example of such agency is fleshly beauty , 
which can be perceived through effects it generates that are not rigidly 
determined by other forms of social organisation. 
The beauty of youth, male and female, redirects the gaze and interest of 
society, away from the wisdom, spiritual powers, and social capital of their 
elders.  It could be said to impose some limits on the ability of social structures  to 
reproduce themselves in the next generation.  A woman may (illicitly or not) 
choose the beautiful male youth over the elder man her family or social group 
prefer for his wealth or status.  Such “fatal attractions” may be more or less rare 
depending on social structure and individual daring, but they nevertheless have 
the potential to subvert the “rules” of marriage and alliance.  The social effects of 
beauty can, in some situations, limit the powers of elders, injecting unpredictable 
dynamism to generational relationships and social reproduction.   
If Nature is democratic in its relative blindness to status markers when it 
allocates beauty, it is even more democratic in its indifference to such markers 
when it takes beauty away through physical decline. Aging, like beauty, is also a 
social construction.  Yet aging entails the diminishment of physical properties of 
the body, including beauty, strength, and sexual and reproductive powers.  This 
biological process can stand in tension with social aging: the power and wealth 
that generally accrue to higher status people as they pass through the life course 
can be undermined by their physical decline (another “just injustice” of beauty).   
For this reason perhaps plástica provokes much black humour and social 
aspiration in Brazil.  When surgery “fails,” it is seen as a futile effort to counter 
biological levelling, exposing the fact that despite all her disadvantages the poor 
moça, “girl,” will still be more beautiful than the rich senhora.  Such failures 
reinforce a feeling that youth, beauty, and physicality are precious resources, 
available to all, and not the privileges – unlike so much else in life – of the 
wealthy and high born.  On the other hand, when plástica succeeds, it is seen to 
pile on unfairness to the unfairness of social hierarchy, allowing the rich to 
seemingly free themselves from the depredations of Nature.  Some working class 
women vehemently assert their “right” to plástica, as if the prospect that they 
would be denied the medical escape from aging that has become routine among 
the middle class would be a final, unbearable injustice.    
Of course it’s also true that beauty norms are to some extent culturally 
embedded, and cannot be easily disembedded.  The Azawagh beauty norm is an 
example.  Yet fleshly beauty also “travels” remarkably well.  In globalised 
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markets of sexual relationships – such as romance tourism, online apps, and 
“arranged” transnational marriages, etc. – attractiveness is a primary currency, 
one that has an exchangeable and mobile value.  Even aside from such 
phenomena of consumer capitalism, historically beauty has been legible across 
great social gulfs.  It can spark the cross-class “fatal attractions” mentioned by 
Bourdieu, undermine political alliances, or cross ethnic divides.  The capacity of a 
beautiful person to cause happy, or often tragic, events is a major trope in 
Western myth and art (from the Trojan wars to Georgian novels and Brazilian 
telenovelas).  Sociologically, though, we have paid much less attention to the role 
of beauty in the attraction and bonding which are, after all, necessary for social 
life.   
Anthropology has documented variable patterns in marriage proscription 
and prescription.  Some societies proscribe marriage with a cross cousin, or 
prescribe marriage with a parallel cousin.  Others have inverse rules.  Numerous 
structures also govern the “exchange of women,” putting groups into 
relationships as “wife givers” and “wife takers” (e.g. Black 1972).  These models, 
however, rarely map onto actual marriage practices.  There are multiple reasons 
for this, but one neglected one is that attraction and courtship do not always 
serve the needs of social reproduction or political alliance. 
Ethnographers are in a good position to study the effects that beauty has 
on partner choice, the social conflicts that arise as a result, and the limits 
imposed on the powers of elders to determine youth relationships.  For example, 
in societies where men continue to marry new wives over the course of their 
lives, the beauty of the male youth may give him the capacity to compete with an 
elder who has more status, trade relationships, or resources. The random 
inheritance of beauty is a parallel system for allocating power and status that 
sometimes reinforces, and sometimes interferes with, proscribed and prescribed 
partner choice. 
Beauty is only one element in courtship and attraction (amongst other 
qualities such as wealth, wit, artistic virtuosity, etc.)  Scholars, though, seem to 
have minimised its role in partner choice, perhaps due to European spiritualised 
notions of both beauty and romantic love.  Consider these examples of modern 
cultural common sense that distinguish between “inner” and “outer beauty”: 
Beauty is skin deep or the eyes are beautiful because they are a window onto the 
soul.  Both these statements reflect Kantian distinctions between a courser 
physical and a more spiritual beauty of the person, one that is animated by 
“moral feeling.”  Fleshly beauty seems to be too superficial or transient a basis 
for lasting love and partnership.  And it probably is.  Yet anthropologists and 
historians emphasise that the social expectation that romantic love should 
accompany marriage or life long partnership is far from universal (Jankowiak 
1995, 2008).  It was not historically an expectation in Brazil.  The model of 
enduring romantic love between married “partners” is still seen as foreign or 
unfamiliar in some regions, and significantly denoted with the English word lovi, 
instead of the Portuguese amor (Rebhun 1999).   
What seems to be more widespread than “lovi” in the ethnographic and 
historical record is an affect that resembles more the English folk category of the 
“crush,” a transitory state of infatuation.  This swoon-like affect blends intrusive 
thoughts of the beloved, overwhelming feelings of desire, and often perceptions 
of his or her radiant beauty (Harris 1995).  It implies feedback relationships 
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amongst attraction, erotic pleasure, and perceptions of attractiveness, with each 
of these affects reinforcing each other.  Beauty could be said to be “generative” in 
the sense that it is often integral to experiences of attraction and has the 
potential to overcome status differences or other barriers – such as the disgust 
provoked by too close contact with the flesh of another person – that might 
otherwise keep partners apart. 
I have discussed some of the hitherto neglected ways that social science 
and humanities can contribute to understanding fleshly beauty.  Much 
scholarship has demonstrated an impressive variability in aesthetic norms and 
practices as well as their risks, such as body alienation, bodily harm, and social 
discrimination.  However, I have proposed that we also study the responses to 
attractiveness in everyday life.  
Such responses might seem uninteresting or irrelevant for social theory, 
perhaps because they are seen as merely private.  Yet, investigating them focuses 
attention on what is specific to beauty as a domain of social life.  The inheritance 
of physical beauty can bypass other systems for allocating status, or provoke 
relationships that do not follow cultural logics of proscribed or prescribed 
partner choice.  Aesthetic perceptions also have a capacity to be shared across 
ethnic, class and cultural boundaries, perhaps especially in the globalised 
markets of consumer capitalism.  Beauty can generate strong affects, pleasant or 
unpleasant, and set in motion new relationships.  Ethnographers are in a good 
position to shed light on these effects and contribute a richer, practice-oriented 
perspective on the role of beauty in social life. 
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1 We earlier saw how Stratz asserted the superiority of Nordic beauty, a claim that influential Brazilian 
anthropologist Gilberto Freyre (who had been a student of Boas) vigorously opposed, not only by 
countering that racial mixture was aesthetically superior to Aryan purity, but also by attacking the very 
notion of aesthetics as disinterested contemplation (like European Primitivist avant -gardes and other 
“decadents” he argued that beauty was inextricably entangled with eroticism). 
